

**Public Administration and the Recruitment of Political
Elites: Formal and Material Politicization in Catalonia**

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INTRODUCTION

The study of administrations -"black boxes" of political systems- can be approached from different perspectives, and numerous research methods can be used to analyze them. For this paper, as will be seen shortly, I have chosen to focus on the individuals who manage the Administration, and have relied on personal interviews as the basis of my working method. This paper is, therefore, a study of political elites and, more specifically, of the political elites found in the Catalan Administration.

Studies on political elites are still scarce and the subject still needs to be properly developed. Such deficiencies are even more serious in countries, like Spain, lacking a long democratic tradition. It could even be said that the subject of political elites is perhaps the least studied aspect of the Spanish political system, and, as we know, it is a subject that can yield much relevant information on how political systems really work. There are a number of papers on political party's elites, parliamentary elites, and local elites. In contrast, there are very few papers on political elites in the Administration. With my research, of which this paper is only a small part, I intend to make up for the imbalance in the field, while at the same time approaching the study of the Administration from a new perspective.

This paper deals with political elites in the Catalan Administration. It is, therefore, a paper on a subject that is limited both geographically and in terms of the human component it analyzes. As far as its geographical limits are concerned, it is a paper on the Administration of one of the most important autonomous communities in Spain. Catalonia has a population of 6 million; a general budget of over one and a half billion pesetas, one of the largest budgets of all Spanish autonomous communities; and its civil service employs about 35,000 people.

Since the 1980 Catalan autonomous elections, the first elections after democracy was restored at the end of the Franco regime, Catalonia has been governed by a party coalition called *Convergència i Unió (CiU)*. Since then, this coalition has won all autonomous elections by absolute majority (see Table 1). Thus, if we were to apply Sartori's typology¹, we would describe the Catalan party system as a "predominant party system".

CiU is a coalition of two parties: *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC)* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC)*. The ideology of the former can be labeled as Catalan nationalist, while the latter is Christian democrat. The undisputed leader of the coalition is Jordi Pujol, the President of the Catalan

Government since 1980, and also the president of CDC, the largest party in the coalition.

As far as the limited group of individuals it studies, this paper focuses on the so-called "high officials" of the Catalan Administration, namely, its Secretaries General and General Directors. The two basic laws that have to be mentioned concerning the regulations for high officials of the Catalan Administration are: Law 3/1982 of March 23, on the Parliament, on the President and on the Executive Council of the Generalitat; and especially Law 13/1989 of December 14, concerning the organization, the procedure and the juridical regime of the Administration of the Generalitat de Catalunya. Both laws were approved by the Catalan Parliament.

If we look at the internal structure of each one of the fourteen departments² which together compose the Catalan Administration (Table 2), we will realize that what is being studied are politically designated positions (the political elites of the Administration), whose candidates enjoy the political confidence of those who propose them (the *consellers* or ministers), and of those who actually appoint them (the Executive Council). These positions can be discretionarily filled by individuals who do not need to be members of the public service (no specific knowledge or special condition is therefore required). Other positions, however, are distinctly set apart, such as Catalan Government positions (*consellers*-governmental elites), or freely assigned positions, which unlike politically assigned positions, have to be occupied by members of the public service (public service elites).

The ministers, elected by the President of the Generalitat, are at the head of each administrative Department and constitute, with the President, the Catalan government. The ministers are, therefore, governmental elites. Under them, we find the Secretaries-General (there is one *per* department), who are the second authority of the department and who carry out technical and political functions (article 13 of Law 13/1989). These are, for instance, representing the Department in the name of the minister, communicating with other Administrations and entities related to them, coordination of the actions of the Department in relation to the transfer of functions and services, coordination of the programs and actions of the head office as well as of the bodies dependent on the Department, etc. As a result, the technical functions have a decisive influence on political aspects (for instance, functions related to the budget or to the staff of the Department). Under them, there are the General Directors. There may be more than one *per* department (as a rule, there are between four and eight) and their functions (article 14 of Law 13/1989) never go beyond the boundaries of the head office (affairs of the Department which

are their duty, affairs related to their position, subjects proper to the head office, services dependent on them), and all have a sectorial background.

Under the General Directors, there may be Deputy General Directors, which are posts that are freely designated, that is to say, that require having a precise category in the civil servant hierarchy, but which are selected rather than contested. Finally, under such posts, there may be heads of services, heads of sections, and heads of department sectors, who are civil servants and, therefore, get to these posts through the usual procedure in the public administration.

There is also another, time-related, limitation inherent in the scope of this paper. In it, none of the people who have occupied high positions (Secretaries General and General Directors) in the Catalan Administration since 1980 have been studied. It is not a study of recent history of the Catalan Administration (a retrospective study), but rather focuses on high officials who completed the third legislature and began the fourth one, that is to say, those who were holding a position in the first quarter of 1992. At that time, there were a total of sixty-six General Directors and fifteen Secretaries General (the Department of the Presidency is the only one with two Secretaries General), which constituted the field of study, that is to say, a total of eighty-one high officials. This figure, however, amounts to 50% of the total number of people who have been Secretaries General or General Directors from 1980 until 1994, since a high percentage of high officials included in this category have been in office for a number of years, some of them until the present. This is a trait that points to a certain stability in this kind of positions.

I am especially interested in finding out about the recruitment process of the political elites in the Catalan Administration; knowing what the prevailing criteria for appointing high officials in the Catalan Administration are and, more specifically, whether technical or political criteria determine the final decision; and, from there, establishing the **degree of politicization** found in the Administration. In order to find out about all these aspects, I have resorted to one of the most frequently used methods when studying political elites in depth: personal interviews based on a questionnaire. The interviews, which I myself carried out, included a questionnaire composed of more than eighty questions. For the purposes of this paper, however, I will only comment on aspects related to the recruitment of high officials.

Out of a total of eighty-one high officials, I interviewed seventy-seven of them; that is to say, 95%. This percentage, which I qualify as an absolute success,

makes the analysis of the answers more reliable and a solid base to my conclusions, since I am not working with a sample, but with almost all the census.

2. FORMAL POLITICIZATION

Public administrations, like any other human organization, are composed of groups of individuals structured in the form of a pyramid: those who are on top -at the vertex of the pyramidal structure- theoretically wielding more power, and being more influential, than those who are below them in rank. This is something that can be found in almost any country in the world. There is a larger measure of heterogeneity, however, in the configuration of administrative structures, in interpersonal relations (inside a department, between departments, between institutions, and with the social totality whom they manage), in decision making, in the regulation of institutional management, in the sheer magnitude, in the terminology used, etc., but also in the recruitment of high officials. As far as the latter point is concerned, administrations can be divided up in two distinct groups: those that are more politicized and those that are less politicized. Although different criteria can be applied to gauge the degree of formal politicization of a given administration, we can conclude that administrations with a longer public service career or, in other words, with fewer politically appointed positions (as well as fewer freely appointed positions) are less formally politicized than other administrations with a shorter public service career, or with more politically assigned positions (as well as more freely assigned positions). In order to find out what system prevails in a given administration, one must simply read the current norms regulating the recruitment of candidates for all its different offices. These norms establish what positions are to be filled by public service members that are to be freely assigned, and which can be politically assigned³. In addition to that, the exact number of positions falling into each one of these categories needs to be established. Once this information is obtained, we are equipped to determine the degree of **formal politicization**⁴.

The Catalan Administration, unlike others based on the "Whitehall model"⁵, is a formally politicized administration: there are many positions that are politically appointed within its pyramidal administrative structure. Moreover, it could also be argued that as the Administration has gradually evolved, it has become more politicized, since the number of high-ranking officials has increased. Thus, in 1981, just one year after the first autonomous elections, there were only fifty high positions⁶ to be filled, that is, twenty-eight less than those contemplated in this paper.

But in order to establish with higher precision the level of formal politicization prevalent in the Catalan Administration, it is necessary to undertake a comparative analysis with the administrations of other Spanish autonomous communities. Table 3 shows a list of politically appointed positions in Spanish autonomous communities, while Table 4 is a listing by autonomous communities of the total number of these positions⁷.

The Basque Country, Catalonia, and Andalusia are the autonomous communities with the largest numbers of high positions. The remaining communities have much lower numbers of high positions, especially Aragon and Navarre, which feature the smallest amounts. We might also add that from the point of view of recruitment regulations, the Aragonese Administration is the one with the most "professionalized" organizational structure, or the least politicized one. Lastly, we might also conclude that when calculating the total number of political positions in the administrations of the various autonomous communities, neither the number of administrative areas the community is responsible for managing, nor the total number of public service employees, are determining factors (as can be inferred from the cases of Navarre and Valencia, both of which are communities with low levels of political positions and high levels of administrative responsibility)⁸.

3. MATERIAL POLITICIZATION

In order to find out the exact degree of politicization present in a given Administration, however, one must go beyond the purely normative and quantitative perspective: it becomes necessary to establish its degree of **material politicization**, that is to say, to determine what are the criteria used to recruit candidates for politically appointed positions. In order to obtain this kind of information, it is necessary to carry out an individualized, detailed analysis of all individuals holding office, and then study their *cursus honorum*.

This information is crucial for an understanding of the phenomenon of politicization in the Catalan Administration. We must determine whether, in addition to a formally -structurally- politicized administration, we can also talk about the existence of a materially politicized Administration in Catalonia, that is to say, an Administration whose real criteria, when appointing candidates for positions that are assigned discretionarily, are mainly political. Material politicization is,

undoubtedly, the kind of politicization that best defines the prevailing degree of politicization in a given Administration.

3.1. Political Affiliation

The first -and perhaps the main- factor to be taken into account is the political affiliation of those in high office. An administration in which political positions are occupied by individuals who belong to the governing party (or parties), can be regarded as being more materially politicized than another administration where this is not the case.

In Catalonia, two out of three high positions are assigned to members of the governing coalition parties. Of these, a little over 70% belong to CDC, and almost 30% to UDC. Thus, in terms of political affiliation, high positions in the Catalan Administration are distributed as is shown in Table 5.

These percentages confirm our claim that the Catalan Administration is not only formally politicized, as we just saw, but also materially politicized⁹ (or, as other specialists would phrase it¹⁰, not very "professionalized"). It is in such a way that one could even argue that there is a certain tendency towards a "spoils system"¹¹, as well as a strong sense of loyalty and of political kinship among its high officials¹². Although we do not have exact evidence regarding the evolution of political affiliations among high officials, Alfonso de Alfonso Bozzo calculated that political affiliation among Secretaries General and General Directors in the Catalan Administration in 1981 was not at all common, "about 18%"¹³. We can infer from this, that the degree of material politicization in the Catalan Administration over the past ten years has undergone a very sharp increase, especially if we consider that "the longer the time the same party remains in power, the less necessary it becomes to resort to 'political' or 'presidential appointees'"¹⁴. Administrations with no tradition of public service, like the Catalan Administration, and therefore, where public service bodies have no consolidated influence (in contrast with what, to some extent, occurs in the Spanish central Administration¹⁵, and especially in the French one)¹⁶, formal politicization also becomes material politicization¹⁷, that is to say, politically appointed positions are filled mostly according to political criteria¹⁸. As a result of this, the chances for a career in the public service are severely reduced, a situation that may discourage those who are already pursuing it (especially if they are young, which is what happens in the Catalan Administration), or those who have yet to begin their careers. In Catalonia, other factors are brought into play which, in my opinion, also tend to add to the already high degree of material politicization in the Administration. On the one hand, the secondary role

and minor influence of the Catalan Parliament, and, on the other, the existence of a coalition government. The presence for many years of an ample majority both in Parliament and government -a government that enjoys the support of an absolute majority in Parliament- has been undermining the protagonism of Parliament and strengthening the role of the Administration. As a result, political initiative has been almost entirely placed in the hands of the Administration, and appointees for political positions in the Administration are chosen predominantly on the basis of political criteria. In this way, a faithful implementation of the governing coalition's political program is ensured. It is known that coalition governments, like the one governing Catalonia since 1980, usually bring forth an artificial growth of the administrative structure -of that part of the structure where political positions are concentrated-. This is precisely as a consequence of the desire on the part of coalition members to cover a maximum number of politically assigned positions and, thus, to reach as many areas of political influence as possible by placing in them individuals connected to the party. The lack of consolidated public service bodies, the minor political role of the Parliament and the existence of a coalition government are the three basic factors that can help explain the high degree of material politicization present in the Catalan Administration. In spite of that, the fact that one third of high officials are people who are not involved in party politics can also indicate a certain introduction of specialists and/or technicians (individuals who have been recruited on the basis of their specialized training) to fill positions of political management in the Administration.

As far as the division between Secretaries General and General Directors is concerned, we have been able to observe that the former are proportionally more linked to political parties (86%) than the latter are (60%)¹⁹. Secretaries General tend to be individuals who enjoy greater political trust from the ministers than General Directors do. Whenever a minister is replaced, its Secretary General is also replaced, which is not the case with General Directors²⁰, who, as we have already mentioned, have clearly delimited sectorial functions which tend to require a more specialized profile from the person responsible for their implementation. The fact that there is greater political trust placed on Secretaries General can also be the reason why they are proportionally more involved with political parties than General Directors, since political parties are the main fora for the establishment of political loyalties and interpersonal alliances.

3.2. Professional Itinerary

As far as the professional itinerary of political officials in the Administration is concerned, we could also describe a number of different tendencies. An

administration in which politically assigned officials have a background in the private sector or in elective public positions tends to be more politicized than an administration in which public positions are given to members of the public service.

What is the situation in Catalonia? A little more than half of all high officials (52%), had worked in the public sector before entering the Catalan Administration, and the remaining 48% in the private one. Neither sector can be considered as the main source for the provision of high officials, but the percentage of those coming in from the private sector can be regarded as considerably high. Thus, if we take into account figures from the early eighties, with 54% of high administration officials coming from the public sector and 26% from the private one²¹, we can argue that the degree of "privatization" of professional sources of provision of high officials, that even then was regarded as high, has undergone an even greater increase in the last ten years. In the case of administrations in other countries, the transfer from the private sector to public management rarely takes place. Thus, in the French Administration, the source of provision to fill managerial positions -which, theoretically, are freely appointed positions, although "in practice, the minister's choice of a Director is limited by or accommodated to the rivalries between the various corps"-²², is invariably the public sector. This is a result, among other reasons, of the difference in salary and the limited knowledge of "outsiders" (those coming in from the private sector) of the norms and mechanisms of the Administration²³. In the United States, although there is also a predominance of officials coming from the public sector, the difference in salaries is not as pronounced as in France²⁴.

As for the Catalan Administration, such an important presence of the private sector, as one of the main sources of provision of high officials, was already explained in the early eighties. The reasons were on the one hand, "the political qualification of the governing coalition, CiU, an alliance of two nationalist, conservative parties with strong, even personal, ties in the local banking sector and local private industries;" and on the other, by "the traditional 'reluctance' of the Catalan middle classes and Catalan nationalists to work for the public sector and the Administration"²⁵. Such explanations can lead us to regard the considerable percentage of high officials coming in from the private sector as additional evidence of the material politicization of the Catalan Administration. Moreover, if we pay close attention to the political affiliation of high officials, we will see that non-affiliated high officials come mainly from the public sector (58%), while those connected with a given political party come primarily from the private sector (52%).

One out of five high officials has occupied or still occupies an elective public position (more specifically, 13% have held them, and 7% still held them at the moment when the interviews were being carried out). Such percentages are not completely irrelevant, if we bear in mind the short life of Spanish democratic institutions. Of course, there is a big difference between high officials who are affiliated to the governing coalition parties and those who are not. Thus, while almost 30% of affiliated members have occupied or still occupy an elective public position (without marked differences between those affiliated to CDC and members of UDC), among the non-affiliated, however, we have only found one case.

Most high officials in the Catalan Administration (almost 60%) are not members of the public service. As we have already shown, candidates for the positions of Secretary General or Director General do not need to be members of the public service (in contrast to what happens, for instance, in similar positions of the British Administration where, consequently, "a professional sociology of the Permanent Secretaries would not make much sense (...), since probably all of them have a professional background in the Administration")²⁶, nor is there, as we already pointed out, any pressure on those in charge of appointing candidates to choose members of the public service (as is the case of those administrations with a longer tradition of public service and in which public service bodies, such as, for instance, public administration high officials, diplomats, finance inspectors, and trade technicians in the Spanish Administration, play a more influential role²⁷; and, especially, the *grand corps* of the French Administration)²⁸. For these reasons, in the case of the Catalan Administration, it is not possible to speak of a process of "colonization of the political class"²⁹ by those working in the public service, as occurs, for instance, in the French Administration. Nevertheless, the fact that 40% of those occupying high positions are members of the public service could be interpreted as a mild "colonization" process of political management positions on the part of public service elites. However, such a claim would have to be qualified, since more than 80% of high officials who are also in the public service are affiliated to one of the two governing parties in Catalonia and, thus, what really takes place, in words of Mariano Baena, is a "preferential assignation that allows those affiliated to the governing party to occupy positions according to their experience and knowledge in managing a government. When this process takes place, it is not really the Administration that colonizes the political class, since the actual protagonists are the political parties themselves"³⁰.

As a result of all this, one may therefore conclude that professional itineraries are a way of consolidating the high degree of material politicization found among high officials of the Catalan Administration.

4. CONCLUSIONS

If we take into account the normative make-up of the structure of the Catalan Administration, we will conclude that it is a **formally politicized** structure, and, if we compare the number of high officials in the various autonomous communities in Spain, we will see how the Catalan Administration is one of the most politicized. In relation to what I have been referring to as its **material politicization**, although there are no exact figures available from the other autonomous communities that would enable us to establish a formal comparison, we can also say that, in the case of Catalonia, we are dealing with a clearly politicized Administration. Two out of three high officials are affiliated to one of the two parties that together form the governing coalition; almost half of them come from the private sector; one out of five has held an elective public position; and only about 40% are actually employed in the public service. Such percentages are difficult to find in other European Administrations. Finally, the evolution of the Catalan Administration has brought about a higher degree of formal and material politicization. At the present moment, there are many more politically appointed positions, many more officials that are affiliated to either one of the two governing parties, and many more that have come in from the private sector.

Table 1

TABLE 1 Parliamentary seats obtained by Catalan political parties in the autonomous elections (Catalan parliament)				
	1980	1984	1988	1992
CIU	43	73	69	70
PSC	33	40	42	40
PSUC/IC^a	25	6	9	7
CP/AP/PP^a	--	11	6	7
ERC	14	5	6	11
CDS	--	--	3	--
CC-UCD	18	--	--	--
PSA	2	--	--	--
TOTAL SEATS	135	135	135	135
a. Parties that have changed names in successive elections. CiU: Convergència i Unió PSC: Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya PSUC: Partit Socialista Unificat de Catalunya IC: Iniciativa per Catalunya CP: Coalición Popular AP: Alianza Popular PP: Partido Popular ERC: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya CDS: Centro Democrático y Social CC-UCD: Centristes de Catalunya-Unión de Centro Democrático PSA: Partido Socialista de Andalucía				

Table 2

TABLE 2 Structure of the Catalan administration	
GOVERNMENT ELITES	
Head of the Administration	PRESIDENT
Department Head	MINISTERS
POLITICAL ELITES IN THE ADMINISTRATION	
politically assigned positions	SECRETARIES GENERAL
	GENERAL DIRECTORS
PUBLIC SERVICE ELITES	
freely assigned positions	UNDER GENERAL DIRECTORS
members of the public service	HEADS OF THE SERVICES
	HEADS OF THE SECTION
	HEADS OF DEPARTMENT SECTORS

Table 3

Table 3 Politically appointed positions in Spanish autonomous communities
<p>ANDALUSIA Vice-ministers - technical Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>ARAGON Directors General^a</p> <p>ASTURIAS Vice-ministers - technical Secretaries - Directors General</p> <p>BALEARIC ISLANDS technical Secretaries General - Directors General^b</p> <p>BASQUE COUNTRY Vice-ministers - Secretaries General - Directors^c</p> <p>CANARY ISLANDS Vice-ministers - technical Secretaries General - Director General</p> <p>CANTABRIA technical Secretaries General - regional Directors^d</p> <p>CASTILE AND LEON Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>CASTILE-LA MANCHA Vice-ministers - technical Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>CATALONIA Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>EXTREMADURA technical Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>GALICIA Secretaries General - technical Secretaries General - Directors General</p> <p>LA RIOJA technical Secretaries General - Directors General^e</p> <p>MADRID Vice-ministers - technical Secretaries General - Directors General^f</p> <p>MURCIA Secretaries General - Directors General^g</p> <p>NAVARRRE Directors General</p> <p>VALENCIA subsecretaries- Directors General</p>
<p>a. These are freely appointed, and must therefore be filled by members of the civil service.</p> <p>b. There are no hierargical differences between them.</p> <p>c. General Secretaries have the rank of Vice-ministers.</p> <p>d. Both positions share the same hierarchical status and are frrely assigned.</p> <p>e. They are all positioned on the same hierargical level.</p> <p>f. General Directors have to preferrably come from within the public service.</p> <p>g. These are also sectorial Secretaries</p>

Table 4

TABLE 4	
Number of political offices in Spanish autonomous communities^a	
Andalusia	82
Aragon	37
Asturias	56
Balearic Islands	52
Basque country	160
Canary Islands	63
Cantabria	38
Castile and León	38
Castile- La Mancha	45
Catalonia	94
Extremadura	46
Galicia	65
La Rioja	39
Madrid	53
Murcia	54
Navarre	23
Valencia	56

a. The number include the ministers in each autonomous community.

Table5

TABLE 5	
Political affiliation of high officials	
CDC members	46.8%
UCD members	18.2%
non-affiliated	33.8%
no answer	1.3%
	(n=77)

NOTES

- (1) SARTORI, G.: *Partidos y sistemas de partidos*. Madrid, Alianza, 1980. (1976).
- (2) The fourteen departments are: Presidency; Interior; Treasury; Education; Culture; Health and Social Security; Territorial Policy and Public Works; Agriculture, Stock Farming and Fishing; Labor; Justice; Industry and Energy; Trade, Consumer Advice and Tourism; Social Welfare; and Environmental Affairs.
- (3) To the just mentioned offices we should add advisers and heads, or directors, of ministerial cabinets, but this paper does not contemplate them.
- (4) What Rafael Jiménez Asensio and Adela Mesa call "structural politicization" (see JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO, R. and MESA DEL OLMO, A.: *La libre designación en la función pública vasca*. Bilbao, Manu Robles-Arangiz Institutua, 1993, p. 21).
- (5) Although the United Kingdom has long stood for apolitical public service, see also FORTIN, Y.: "La fin du Civil Service apolitique et fermé?", *Pouvoirs*, nº 37/1986, p. 71-86; and LEE, M.: "Fonctionnement du Gouvernement et rôle du Premier Ministre sous Mme Thatcher", *Pouvoirs*, nº 37/1986, p. 45-57.
- (6) DE ALFONSO, A.: "Los 'altos cargos' de la Generalitat: ¿administradores o políticos?", *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, nº 25/1982, p. 85 and 87. During the same period, the Basque Administration had a total of eighty-nine high officials similar to those found in the Catalan Administration (twenty-nine Vice-ministers and sixty Directors), as A. MESA DEL OLMO points out in "Datos de estructura y movilidad de los cargos de designación política en la Administración autónoma vasca (1980-1989)", in the joint study, *Estudios sobre el Estatuto de Autonomía del País Vasco*. Oñati, HAEE/IVAP, vol. III, 1991, p. 1600.
- (7) These tables are based on Rafael JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO's study on politically assigned positions in public administrations entitled "Política y Administración: los puestos de designación política en las administraciones públicas", *Revista Vasca de Administración Pública*, nº 32/1992, p. 90-91 and 94.
- (8) JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO, R.: *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- (9) For a discussion of the importance of recruitment criteria in the concept of politicization in a given administration, see STAHLBERG, K.: "La politisation de l'Administration publique: Réflexions sur le concept, les causes et les conséquences de la politisation", *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*, nº 3/1987, p. 425-429.
- (10) SERRANO, T.: *Características básicas de los directivos de la Administración del Estado en España*. Madrid, Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset, 1993, p. 8 (Papeles de trabajo, nº 293).
- (11) Of course, this tendency never reaches the level of politicization found in the American Administration, where the spoils system or allotment of public offices by the winning party in the presidential elections "involves 2,500 high officials, or 23 per cent (whereas in countries like the United Kingdom or France, it only affects 2.5 to 1.2 per cent respectively)" (JEREZ, M.: "La composición de las élites en los Estados Unidos", *Revista de Estudios Políticos*, nº 48/1985, p. 85). Alfonso DE ALFONSO BOZZO also refers to the spoils system in his paper on high officials in the Catalan Administration, "Los 'altos cargos' de la Generalitat: ¿administradores o políticos?" (*op. cit.*, p. 90 and 99).

- (12) "... much more evident than in the case of 'high officials' in the Madrid Government, of the French Directeurs, or of the British Permanent Secretaries", (DE ALFONSO, A.: *op. cit.*, p. 86).
- (13) DE ALFONSO, A.: *op. cit.*, p. 91.
- (14) TIMSIT, G.: "Le modèle occidental d'administration", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, n° 23/1982, p. 463.
- (15) In relation to the situation of the Spanish Administration in the eighties, however, Alejandro Nieto points out that "the party inexorably made the high positions its own, and then, as candidates became gradually available, it also took hold of positions immediately below. This reveals not only a willingness to reward its sympathizers and strengthen loyalty ties, but also the initial mistrust on the part of the Government towards bureaucrats inherited from previous governments.
Such tendency can be interpreted, depending on the point of view, either as a sensible measure aimed at furnishing the administration with loyal public service members, at the service both vocationally and ideologically of government policies, or as a grossly overt expression of the age-old, never totally forgotten, spoils principle". (NIETO, A.: "La Administración y la burocracia del Estado en la década de los ochenta", *Revista Vasca de Administración Pública*, n° 13/1985, p. 180.
Tomás Ramón FERNÁNDEZ also mentions the politicization in the Spanish Administration in the same period in his article, "Les réformes de la fonction publique en France et en Espagne", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, n° 38/1986, p. 79-80. In contrast, Jaime MONTALVO argues that "when the Socialists gained power, there was, undoubtedly, some of the inevitable pressure from certain opportunistic sectors, but there was in no way any kind of deliberate or conscious policy of spoils system, since what was involved were management positions that did not have a particularly strong political nature. For instance, at the Ministry of the Presidency, fewer than half of all General Directors were affiliated to the Socialist Party". (Discussion panel, "Évolutions récentes et perspectives d'avenir des fonctions publiques française et espagnole", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, n° 38/1986, p. 89).
- (16) The main indicator of the degree of politicization in the French Administration can be found, as Jean-Paul Costa points out, in the ministerial cabinets where "there are no restrictions on recruitment." Ministerial cabinets are one of the "essential factors of the bringing together of the political and the administrative as well as of the politicization of the Administration." (COSTA, J.P.: Politisation de la fonction publique et alternance en France", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, n° 38/1986, p. 60.
- (17) Since, as Gérard Timsit and Céline Wiener argue, "it is tempting (...) for politicians to secure the fidelity of the administration by an obligation of loyalty or by favoritism, but especially to keep positions of responsibility for devoted followers of their beliefs." (TIMSIT, G. and WIENER, C.: "Administration et politique en Grande-Bretagne, en Italie et en République Fédérale d'Allemagne", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, n° 3/1980, p. 527.
- (18) The French Administration, however, is formally but not materially politicized, since its grand corps are in charge of and control, to a large extent, the recruitment of candidates for politically assigned positions. For a discussion on problems derived from low levels of material politicization on the high spheres of French Administration, see RAFFI, G.: "Le reclassement des directeurs", *Pouvoirs*, n° 40/1987, p. 31-37, and CARCASSONNE, G.: "La souhaitable neutralité", *Pouvoirs*, n° 40/1987, p. 92-94.
- (19) In the case of the Spanish Administration, as Juan Santamaría points out, the bureaucratic elites also show a "degree of politicization inversely proportional to their organic status", (SANTAMARÍA, J.: "Le statut de la fonction publique en Espagne", *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, n° 38/1986, p. 11).

- (20) MATAS, J.: "La figura del Secretari General a l'Administració de la Generalitat de Catalunya", *Autonomies*, nº 17/1993.
- (21) DE ALFONSO, A.: *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- (22) SULEIMAN, E.N.: *Politics, Power and Bureaucracy in France*. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1974, p. 142.
- (23) SULEIMAN, E.N.: *op. cit.*, p. 140-141. Such salary difference which accounts for the difficulty in transferring from a private company to the public Administration, can also be found in the case of the Spanish central Administration: SERRANO, T.: *op. cit.*, p. 17.
- (24) BIRNBAUM, P.: "La place des hauts fonctionnaires dans l'élite du pouvoir aux États-Unis", *Revue Française de Science Politique*, nº 4/1973, p. 774.
- (25) DE ALFONSO, A.: *op. cit.*, p. 94.
- (26) DE ALFONSO, A.: *op. cit.*, p. 89.
- (27) By March of 1992, 79% of the General Directors of the Spanish central Administration were members of the public service, while 45% belonged to one of the various bodies of the public service (SERRANO, T.: *op. cit.*, p. 8 and 11, a fact that makes it possible for us to speak of formal, but not material, politicization. During Franco's regime, about 80% of all politically assigned public positions were filled with members of the public service (this figure is slightly higher in the early years and lower in the closing years of the regime). (BELTRÁN, M.: "La Administración Pública y los funcionarios", in GINER, S. (ed.): *España. Sociedad y Política*. Madrid, Espasa-Calpe, 1990, p. 326-327). It is therefore possible to speak also of the influence of long-standing public service bodies in the Spanish Administration, bodies which, as Juan Santamaría Pastor points out, have turned into "a common instrument for the creation of elites, at least in relation to the higher levels of the public service," and "this function of the public service as a selection mechanism is recurrently criticized by certain political groups" (SANTAMARÍA, J.: *op. cit.*, p. 11). On this point, see also, ALBA, C.: "The Organization of Authoritarian Leadership: Franco's Spain", in ROSE, R. and SULEIMAN, E. (eds.): *Presidents and Prime Ministers*. Washington, American Enterprise Institute of Public Policy Research, 1980, p. 276-281; ÁLVAREZ, J.: *Burocracia y poder político en el régimen franquista. (El papel de los cuerpos de funcionarios entre 1938 y 1975)*. Madrid, Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública, 1984.
- (28) Thus, as Rafael Jiménez Asensio points out in regard to politically assigned positions, "theoretically, anyone meeting the general conditions for access into the public service is eligible to carry out this kind of positions, and it is not required that he or she be employed in the public service. Nonetheless, French administrative reality has imposed its own criteria. As a general rule, almost all these positions are covered by public service employees who belong to any of the large bodies in which the French State's Administration is divided up. Thus, one might even argue that there is a process of relative colonization (...) of certain areas within the Administration (Departments, specific Directorates, etc.) by certain elite bodies which, in some cases, go as far as imposing the name of the candidate to be appointed to a politically assigned position". (JIMÉNEZ ASENSIO, R.: *op. cit.*, p.80).
- (29) BAENA, M.: "Quelques réflexions sur la relation entre hommes politiques et hauts fonctionnaires", *Revue Internationale des Sciences Administratives*, nº 1/1987, p. 128-135.
- (30) BAENA, M.: *op. cit.*, p. 130.

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